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TAXATION OF TORT DAMAGES
PATRICIA A. CAIN*
I. Introduction
I have always thought the “go-to” rule for determining whether or not the
receipt of damages should be taxable was to ask this key question: In lieu of
what were the damages received? There are a number of influential cases
on this topic. For example, in Lyeth v. Hoey the United States Supreme
Court ruled that when a disappointed heir settles his undue influence claim
against an estate, he should not have to report the settlement amount as
taxable income because, after all, this settlement amount was paid in lieu of
damages that he would have received if he had continued to press his
lawsuit.1 And, if he had received those damages instead of the settlement,
the damages would have been in lieu of the inheritance he otherwise would
have received.2 Inheritances are excluded from gross income.3 Therefore,
an amount received to replace that inheritance should similarly be excluded
from income.
In contrast, if a taxpayer received damages or a settlement payment in
lieu of lost profits, the amount received should be included in gross income
just as the profits would have been if they had not been lost.4 On the other
hand, if the damages received were to reimburse the taxpayer for her own
capital, then the damages would not be taxable income.5 In “tax parlance”
they would simply be a return of basis.6 Indeed, even if the damages were
the result of a legal malpractice lawsuit against an attorney or accountant
whose bad advice may have caused the taxpayer to pay more out of pocket
on a tax bill, that damage payment would be perceived as returning that
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University, Aliber Family Chair in Law, Emerita,
University of Iowa. This Article is written in fond memory of Professor Jon Forman, a friend
and my “go-to” person on issues relating to Social Security. I was very saddened to learn of
his untimely death, and I am grateful that the law review is dedicating this issue to his
memory.
1. 305 U.S. 188, 196 (1938).
2. Id.
3. I.R.C. § 102.
4. See Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm’r, 123 F.2d 382, 383–84 (6th Cir. 1941);
Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944).
5. See Raytheon, 144 F.2d at 113.
6. See, e.g., Tribune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1988)
(referring to the “balance of the cash as a non-taxable return of basis”). See generally Topic
No. 703: Basis of Assets, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc703 (Jan. 24, 2022) (“In most
situations, the basis of an asset is its costs to you.”).
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money to the taxpayer’s pocket. It is not a taxable gain to retrieve what you
would have been entitled to but for that malpractice.7
But how should we treat damages received in a tort claim intended to
reimburse the taxpayer for personal injury losses? Here, we run into a
different problem. The common law of taxation (for which there is very
little) dealing with the notion of “in lieu of” damages is no longer where we
turn. Instead, we must rely on a statute: § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code.8 It is my position, however, that if § 104(a)(2) does not appear to
apply, we must still consider the “in lieu of” doctrine.
II. A Short History of § 104(a)(2)
When the modern income tax law was enacted in 1913, the statute was
silent on the question of whether tort damages for personal injuries should
be included in income.9 There are arguments on both sides. To the extent
that the damages are paid in cash, they produce a certain amount of
liquidity that did not exist before. As to liquid cash, the taxpayer is clearly
richer after the payment than before the payment. And receiving liquid cash
that makes a taxpayer richer is normally a reason for taxing that increase in
wealth, unless there is a statutory provision that says the receipt is not
taxable.10 Damages might also be received in a personal injury tort lawsuit
for items like lost wages, which should be included in income under the “in
lieu of” theory.11 At the same time, some people view these damages as
restoring a person to the condition she enjoyed before the harm was
inflicted.12 One is not taxed on the ability to enjoy life free of pain and
7. See Clark v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4; see also Rev.
Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23. The IRS has distinguished Clark (overstated tax on return due to
preparer’s error) from cases in which the taxpayer sought advice about taking steps to reduce
taxes. In those cases, when the adviser has given bad advice regarding reduction of taxes,
any malpractice recovery is treated as taxable income. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-33-007
(Aug. 14, 1998). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to embrace this distinction
in McKenny v. United States, 973 F.3d 1291, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2020). But see Douglas
A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Recovery for Causing Tax Overpayment—Lyeth v. Hoey and
Clark Revisited, 74 TAX LAW. 437 (2021) (criticizing the distinction made by the IRS and
the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in McKenny).
8. I.R.C § 104(a)(2).
9. See Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
10. E.g., I.R.C. § 102 (excluding the receipt of gifts from taxable gross income, even
though a gift received certainly makes the taxpayer richer and therefore more able to pay
taxes).
11. See Pistillo v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 145, 148–49 (6th Cir. 1990).
12. See id. at 149–50.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss4/4

2022]

TAXATION OF TORT DAMAGES

589

suffering. So, if a tort injury deprives a person of a pain-free existence, and
that person is able to collect some cash to make her whole again (or at least
as close as possible to whole), then taxing that person seems to be taxing
her restoration to what she used to be (i.e., pain free). If the payment is
viewed as something akin to payment for destroyed human capital (the
ability to live pain free), then just like the restoration of capital costs in lost
property, the payment should not be considered taxable income.
However, in 1915, the Treasury issued a Treasury Decision concluding
that “[a]n amount received as a result of a suit or compromise for ‘pain and
suffering’ is . . . income . . . taxable under the provision of law that includes
‘gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.’” 13 In other
words, the broad language in the tax law defining gross income meant that
damages for pain and suffering looked like a taxable gain. The Attorney
General then opined that such damages were in essence a return of lost
human capital and therefore did not constitute taxable gains.14 The Treasury
subsequently reversed its position.15
In 1918, Congress enacted a statutory provision specifically excluding
from income the amount of any damages received, whether by suit or
agreement, “on account of such [personal] injuries or sickness.”16 That
1918 provision, effective in 1919, remained virtually unchanged in the
Revenue Codes of 1939, 1954, and 1986.17
During this period, a number of important glosses were added to the
statutory meaning of “on account of personal injuries.” The damages had to
be received by a plaintiff making a tort-like claim.18 This requirement was
set forth in the regulations promulgated under § 104(a)(2).19 There were not
many tax cases involving damages received for nonphysical tort injuries,

13. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915).
14. Income Tax—Proceeds of Accident Ins. Pol’y, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918).
15. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457, 457 (1918).
16. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
For further discussion of this history, see Douglas A. Kahn, The Constitutionality of Taxing
Compensatory Damages for Mental Distress When There Was No Accompanying Physical
Injury, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 128 (1999); Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain – No Gain? Should
Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 407
(1987); and Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical but
Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51 (1997).
17. The provision was amended in 1984 to provide an exemption for any damages that
were paid out periodically as a “structured settlement.” Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 1002, 100 Stat 2085, 2388.
18. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
19. Id.
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such as invasion of privacy or defamation. However, in 1983, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Roemer v. Commissioner held that damage to
reputation was a personal injury.20 The Tax Court had ruled the damages
taxable because they were primarily to compensate the taxpayer for damage
to his business reputation rather than his personal reputation.21 The Ninth
Circuit viewed all damage to reputation as primarily personal under
California law, even though that damage might result in loss of income or
damage to business reputation.22 It concluded that this approach accorded
with the IRS practice of excluding punitive damages under § 104, even
though punitive damages otherwise appeared to be taxable under
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.23 As to excluding damages paid for
nonphysical harm, the court cited a 1922 Solicitor’s Opinion holding that
“damages for alienation of affections, defamation of personal character, and
surrender of child custody rights are damages for invasion of personal
rights and not income.”24 In the Tax Court, the taxpayer had also cited a
1972 Tax Court opinion holding that so long as the injury was personal, the
damages paid could be excluded, even in the absence of physical injury.25
The IRS responded to the Roemer decision by issuing a revenue ruling
that held damages received in a wrongful death case, if punitive in nature,
were not paid as compensation for the injury and therefore should be
taxable.26 The IRS also responded to Roemer by indicating that it would not
follow the decision and that it would continue to take the position that the
§ 104(a)(2) exemption from taxation applied only to physical personal
injuries.27
The House of Representatives took notice of the IRS’s position in 1989.
The House proposed an amendment to § 104(a)(2) that would have codified
the IRS position by limiting the exclusion to all damages received for

20. 716 F.2d 693, 700–01 (9th Cir. 1983).
21. Roemer v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 398, 408 (1982).
22. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700.
23. Id.; see also Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1955) (holding
that punitive damages constitute gross income and should be taxed). But in 1975, the IRS
had issued a revenue ruling that concluded punitive damages received in a wrongful death
claim were excluded from income. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, revoked by Rev. Rul.
84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 34.
24. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697 (paraphrasing Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922)).
25. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 405–06 (citing Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32 (1972)).
26. See Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34 (revoking Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B.
47).
27. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, 56.
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physical personal injuries or sickness.28 However, the Senate rejected the
House proposal, and ultimately the Conference Committee elected to
restrict only the exclusion of punitive damages in cases without physical
injury or sickness.29 This action implicitly gave congressional approval to
the exclusion of compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries.
In the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court heard three § 104(a)(2) cases in
fairly rapid succession. First, in 1992, was the Burke decision.30 In United
States v. Burke, the Court adopted the test from the regulations that in order
for the exclusion to apply, a claim had to be sufficiently tort-like.31 In the
Court’s view, the respondent’s claim for sex discrimination under Title VII
did not meet that test since damages under Title VII did not at the time
embrace the broad range of compensatory damages that are generally
available for tort claims.32 Next, in 1995, the Court decided Commissioner
v. Schleier, ruling that damages to compensate for age discrimination could
not meet the test of being tort-like.33 One year later, in O’Gilvie v. United
States, the Supreme Court determined that the language “on account of”
necessitated a somewhat direct connection between the damages and their
cause, meaning that punitive damages could not be excluded.34 O’Gilvie
involved a physical injury, so the language removing punitive damages
from the exclusion in absence of a physical injury was not applicable.35 The
Court found that, generally, punitive damages are caused more by the
tortfeasor’s bad behavior rather than “on account of” the personal injuries.36
Congress has now codified the taxation of punitive damages in
§ 104(a)(2).37
In 1996, just seven years after rejecting the House bill to restrict the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion to cases involving physical injuries,38 Congress

28. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1354–55 (1989) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824–25 (describing the reason for the change to the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion proposed in H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 11641 (1989)).
29. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103
Stat. 2106, 2379.
30. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
31. Id. at 237.
32. Id. at 241–42.
33. 515 U.S. 323, 336–37 (1995).
34. 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996).
35. See id. at 82–83, 90.
36. Id. at 83.
37. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (“[F]or any prior taxable year, gross income does not include . . .
the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received . . . .”).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.
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reversed itself and amended the provision to provide an income tax
exclusion only if the damages were paid “on account of physical injuries or
physical sickness.”39 The amendment’s legislative history is somewhat
sparse and provides no theoretical foundation for why damages for one sort
of personal injury (physical) should be excluded but damages for another
sort of personal injury (nonphysical) should be taxed.40 The Conference
report referred to the abovementioned Supreme Court cases:
Courts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of
damages received on account of personal injury or sickness
broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury that do
not relate to a physical injury or sickness. For example, some
courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases
involving certain forms of employment discrimination and injury
to reputation where there is no physical injury or sickness. The
damages received in these cases generally consist of back pay
and other awards intended to compensate the claimant for lost
wages or lost profits. The Supreme Court recently held [in
Schleier v. Commissioner] that damages received based on a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could
not be excluded from income. In light of the Supreme Court
decision, the Internal Revenue Service has suspended existing
guidance on the tax treatment of damages received on account of
other forms of employment discrimination.41
So, in part, Congress agreed with the Supreme Court cases on
employment discrimination, especially when the damage award seemed to
be in lieu of lost wages. But the Supreme Court had never dealt with other
forms of nonphysical harm, especially any case in which the damages were
for pain and suffering.
The Committee Report does provide some guidance for how the
language excluding damages for nonphysical harms should be construed.
Often, of course, a single claim involves both physical harm and
nonphysical harm. The House Conference Report explains that

39. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat.
1755, 1838 (emphasis added).
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–02 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–94.
41. Id. at 300.
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[t]he House bill provides that the exclusion from gross income
only applies to damages received on account of a personal
physical injury or physical sickness. If an action has its origin in
a physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages (other
than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are treated as
payments received on account of physical injury or physical
sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the
injured party. For example, damages (other than punitive
damages) received by an individual on account of a claim for
loss of consortium due to the physical injury or physical sickness
of such individual’s spouse are excludable from gross income. In
addition, damages (other than punitive damages) received on
account of a claim of wrongful death continue to be excludable
from taxable income as under present law.
The House bill also specifically provides that emotional
distress is not considered a physical injury or physical sickness.
Thus, the exclusion from gross income does not apply to any
damages received (other than for medical expenses as discussed
below) based on a claim of employment discrimination or injury
to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional distress.
Because all damages received on account of physical injury or
physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the
exclusion from gross income applies to any damages received
based on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a
physical injury or physical sickness. In addition, the exclusion
from gross income specifically applies to the amount of damages
received that is not in excess of the amount paid for medical care
attributable to emotional distress.42
The most logical explanation for why Congress made this change is that
it was estimated to raise significant revenue. The amendment was part of
the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,43 which was intended to
stimulate the economy by providing numerous tax cuts to small businesses.
And, of course, whenever tax cuts are made available, the bill must be
revenue neutral and so must include tax increases as well. But the need to
raise revenue is not a sufficient reason to explain why a provision is fair or
in line with larger goals of tax policy.

42. Id. at 301.
43. Small Business Job Protection Act § 1605, 110 Stat. at 1838.
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Numerous commentators have complained about the lack of justification
for this change.44 Some have suggested that while it would be okay to make
all damages taxable, there is no justification for taxing some damages and
exempting others.45 Others have argued that taxing damages received in lieu
of lost wages may make sense, but not all damages for nonphysical harm
are made to replace lost wages.46 It is the taxation of damages for emotional
distress that needs an explanation, but Congress has yet to provide one.
After all, given the construction that Congress gives to the statute in the
legislative history, some emotional distress damages will still be excluded,
provided they are connected to a prior physical injury.47 To me, this rule,
excluding emotional distress damages from statutory coverage unless
accompanied by a physical injury, sounds eerily similar to the rules that
existed in tort law 100 years ago.48 This early tort law history may also help
to explain why the IRS resisted extending § 104(a)(2)’s coverage to
nonphysical harms. Emotional distress damages for nonphysical harms did
not become common until the mid-twentieth century.
III. A Short History of Tort Law’s Physical Injury Requirement
In the 1800s and early 1900s, countless courts refused to award tort
damages for purely emotional distress in the absence of a physical injury.49
Although there were early exceptions to this rule that required physical
injury before a plaintiff could win emotional distress damages, this course
changed in the 1950s when the California Supreme Court recognized an
independent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”).50
44. See, e.g., Ronald H. Jensen, When Are Damages Tax Free?: The Elusive Meaning of
“Physical Injury”, 10 PITT. TAX REV. 87 (2013); Kurt A. Leeper, Arguably Arbitrary:
Taxation and the Physical Injury Requirement of I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2), 55 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 1039 (2005).
45. See Jensen, supra note 44, at 134.
46. See Leeper, supra note 44, at 1057.
47. Id.
48. A handful of other commentators have pointed out this similarity as well. See, e.g.,
Jensen, supra note 44, at 103.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965); see also
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360–61 (5th
ed. 1984); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright:
A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990). But see Watson v. Dilts, 89 N.W. 1068, 1068–69
(Iowa 1902) (supporting a wife’s claim for emotional distress damages based on the fright
she experienced when she saw an intruder attack her husband).
50. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1952).
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Today, to win a claim on the basis of IIED, the plaintiff must prove two
key elements: (1) the defendant’s conduct must be extreme and outrageous,
and (2) the plaintiff must have suffered severe emotional distress.51 The
difficulty in satisfying these elements52 effectively limits the number of
successful IIED claims. It is a mystery why tax law was not willing to
follow tort law’s lead in this regard. If a plaintiff has recovered for IIED,
that plaintiff has jumped over hurdles put in place by tort law. In my view,
that limitation should be honored by tax law.
Tort law recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
even later than the 1950s.53 And like IIED claims, tort law has placed
meaningful parameters around those causes of action as well. There are two
types of claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. One is for the
direct plaintiff.54 There are two types of negligent conduct that can result in
damages solely for emotional distress. One type is conduct that places the
plaintiff in fear of bodily harm despite the fact that no bodily harm occurs,
but rather, only a fear of such harm.55 The Third Restatement provides an
example for this type of claim: a passenger on an airplane fears crashing
and almost certain death due to negligence by the airline. But, at the last
minute, the flight is prevented from crashing. Nonetheless, the passenger’s
emotional distress is a recoverable harm.56 Tax law would tax those
damages because there was no resulting physical injury, only the fear of its
imminence.
Under the Restatement, the other type of direct plaintiff can recover for
emotional distress only on the basis of conduct that “occurs in the course of
specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which

51. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2012); id. at cmt. j.
52. See id. § 46 cmt. j (“The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe
that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.” (alteration in original)).
53. California courts have led in the move toward awarding tort damages for emotional
distress, even in the absence of physical injury. But still, it was not until 1980 that the
California Supreme Court recognized such a claim. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616
P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (awarding emotional distress damages to a husband whose wife had
been misdiagnosed with syphilis and had been advised to have himself tested; he suffered no
physical injury). Some states continue to require proof of physical harm before emotional
distress damages can be awarded in a negligence cause of action. See, e.g., Ware v. ANW
Special Educ. Coop. No. 603, 180 P.3d 610 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
54. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47(a).
55. Id. § 48 cmt. a.
56. Id. § 47 cmt. e, illus. 1.
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negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”57
This rule is an attempt to limit the availability of pure emotional harm
damages.58 The rule is often met in instances involving patients and
physicians.59 The other limiting principle is that the harm must be
“serious.”60
The second type of claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
involves a bystander, i.e., someone who witnesses the physical injury of
someone close to them, typically a family member.61 In early cases of this
sort, the plaintiff was required to prove some type of physical impact to
recover emotional distress damages.62 This requirement, however, was
eroded by the “zone of danger” limitation.63 While some states still apply
that limitation,64 California became a leader in developing the parameters of
this tort by moving away from the “zone of danger” requirement. Under
Dillon v. Legg, which many states have followed, if the plaintiff was
“present” at the time of the tort (usually a car accident in which there was a
physical injury), then the plaintiff can recover (so long as the plaintiff is
closely related to the accident victim).65 This “bystander” version of
negligent infliction of emotional distress would seem to satisfy the IRS’s
current understanding that damages can be excluded so long as someone is
physically injured. After all, the IRS agrees that wrongful death (physical
harm to someone other than the taxpayer) and loss of consortium (also

57. Id. §47(b).
58. Id. §47 cmt. b.
59. Id. §47 cmt. f.
60. Id. § 47(b).
61. Id. § 48 cmt. a.
62. Id.
63. Id. Nonetheless many of these “zone of danger” cases did not result from actual
physical injury to the plaintiff who was claiming emotional distress. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 181 A.D.2d 440, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (denying plaintiff’s IIED
claim because she had not faced “imminent danger of physical harm”). They did, however,
result from physical injury to the victim, typically the victim in a car accident. See, e.g.,
Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 419, 423 (N.Y. 1969) (evaluating a mother’s IIED
claim when her two-year-old child was injured in an automobile accident). Professor John
Diamond provides an excellent review of these negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases and their connection to the physical harm requirement at John Diamond, Rethinking
Compensation for Mental Distress: A Critique of the Restatement (Third) §§ 45–47, 16 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 141, 145–48 (2008).
64. For example, New York still considers the “zone of danger” rule. See Gonzalez, 181
A.D.2d at 440; Graber v. Bachman, 27 A.D.3d 986, 988 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
65. 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
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physical harm to someone other than the taxpayer) both produce damages
that are excluded from income.66
IV. Trying to Reconcile Tax and Torts
Here’s what we know so far. Tax law excludes damages, even damages
to compensate for emotional distress, so long as the taxpayer can show that
a physical injury preceded the emotional distress damages.67 This
conclusion is based (in my view) on the infamous private letter ruling that
is often called the ruling on the “First Pain Incident” and sometimes known
as the “bruise ruling.”68 This ruling addressed the very difficult dividing
line between, on the one hand, physical pain caused by sexual harassment
involving physical injury (bruises or cuts) and, on the other hand, physical
pain that results from the very serious emotional distress that often
accompanies sexual harassment rather than from a physical injury.69 If the
emotional pain occurs before a bruise, it is taxable.70 If it occurs after a
bruise, it is not.71 The IRS explained as follows:
The term “personal physical injuries” is not defined in either
§ 104(a)(2) or the legislative history of the 1996 Act. However,
we believe that direct unwanted or uninvited physical contacts
resulting in observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts,
swelling, and bleeding are personal physical injuries under
§ 104(a)(2). See Black’s Law Dictionary 1304 (Rev. 4th ed.
1968) which defines the term “physical injury” as “bodily harm
or hurt, excluding mental distress, fright, or emotional
disturbance.”72

66. This result was made clear by the Conference Report. See H.R. REP. 104-737, at 301
(1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793. And the IRS has
indicated that it will follow the guidance from the Report. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-21031 (May 25, 2001) (loss of consortium); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-29-020 (July 21, 2000)
(wrongful death).
67. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
68. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41-022 (Oct. 13, 2000); Jensen, supra note 44, at 100
(referring to this private letter as the “bruise ruling”).
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id. Personally, I think this is a trivialization of anyone who has suffered serious
emotional distress and resulting physical injury from sexual harassment, but it is the rule
followed by the IRS to date.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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This seems to mean that mere unwanted touching or fondling is
insufficient to qualify as “personal physical injury,” since there is no
observable harm. Battery is the invasion of one’s personal integrity, but if
one receives damages for that invasion, including emotional distress
damages, then the damages are taxable if the invasion left no bruise.73
Assaults in tort law are similarly viewed as invasions of one’s personal
integrity, but there is not necessarily a touching.74 The IRS rule means that
any recovery of compensatory damages for an assault is taxable.
Both battery and assault are traditional trespassory torts.75 These are the
very sort of compensable invasions that were thought to be worthy of taxfree recoveries from the very early days of our modern income tax.76 False
imprisonment is another traditional trespassory tort.77 Yet, compensatory
damages received for that tort are taxable since no touching or physical
harm is required to establish false imprisonment.78 The 1996 amendment to
§ 104(a)(2) separated tax and tort law in ways that it is doubtful the
legislators understood at the time. They appeared to embrace the traditional
tort law and its accompanying damages while distancing claims based on
such things as sex and age discrimination in employment.
V. The Bright-Line Justification: Problem Cases
The amendment adding the word “physical” to the “personal injury”
requirement in § 104(a)(2) is often defended on the basis that it provided a
“bright line” for those damages that were taxable or nontaxable.79 By
providing clarity the new rule should have reduced litigation over the issue
of taxability of damages. That does not appear to have happened. Taxpayers
who suffer physical pain, injury, or sickness understandably think they are
covered by the exemption language in the statute. But, as we’ve seen, if that

73. See id.; Battery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
74. See Assault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (noting that assault may
occur based on a threat).
75. See Joi T. Christoff, Tax Free Damages: Trespassory Torts and Emotional Harms,
53 AKRON L. REV. 71, 93 (2019).
76. See Jensen, supra note 44, at 89.
77. See Christoff, supra note 75, at 93.
78. See Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 475, 2008 WL 5330828, at *6 (Dec. 22,
2008), aff’d 367 F. App’x 586 (6th Cir. 2010).
79. See Jensen, supra note 44, at 92 (asserting that the amendment “made it clear that
punitive damages awarded in personal injury cases, with one very narrow exception, were
always taxable” (emphasis added)).
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physical pain, injury, or sickness stems from emotional distress,
compensatory damages are taxable.
In many cases it is difficult to tell which came first: the physical injury or
the emotional distress. In real life, these things happen fairly
spontaneously.80 For example, in Parkinson v. Commissioner, the taxpayer
claimed that his employer’s bad treatment of him at work, especially the
stress it put him under, caused him to have a heart attack.81 He sued his
employer and recovered via a settlement agreement.82 While a heart attack
is a physical injury, the question was whether he recovered for emotional
distress that caused him to have a heart attack (all damages would be
taxable) or whether he recovered for having a heart attack that caused him
emotional distress (all damages would be nontaxable).83 In a decision that
defies my sense of understanding, the Tax Court concluded that half of the
damages were attributable to pure emotional distress and were therefore
taxable, but the other half were attributable to the heart attack and therefore
excludable.84 Under the “bruise ruling,” it seems that it should all depend
on which came first.
A similar case is Collins v. Commissioner.85 The taxpayer in Collins
alleged that he experienced racial discrimination by his employer and that a
physician diagnosed his harm as “depression, general anxiety disorder,
hypertension, blood clots, and muscle spasms.”86 He also alleged the
discrimination resulted in high blood pressure.87 One might think that high
blood pressure, hypertension, blood clots, and muscle spasms are physical
sicknesses like a heart attack. But the Tax Court distinguished Parkinson v.
Commissioner by saying that taxpayer Collins signed a settlement
agreement that allocated the contested damage award to emotional

80. See id. at 126 (explaining this connection) (“As the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, the leading guide to the clinical practice of psychiatry, points
out, a ‘compelling literature documents that there is much “physical” in “mental” disorders
and much “mental” in ‘physical’ disorders.’”) (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR, at xxx (4th ed.
2000)).
81. T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-142, 2010 WL 2595005, at *1 (T.C. June 28, 2010).
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id. at *6–7.
85. T.C. Summ. Op. 2017-74, 2017 WL 4015039.
86. Id. at *1.
87. Id.
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distress.88 In other words, the settlement agreement trumped the factual
allegations in the complaint.
Currently, there are no reported cases holding that negligent infliction of
emotional distress damages in “bystander” claims are excluded from tax.
But surely exclusion is the correct result, given the tax treatment of
wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. At the same time, it does
make one wonder why, if all that the plaintiff is experiencing is emotional
distress, a “bystander” plaintiff should be entitled to exclude damages from
taxation when other plaintiffs who suffer only emotional distress damages,
but not on account of another’s physical injury, cannot exclude their
recoveries. Why, as a matter of tax policy, should the cause of the
emotional distress affect the tax consequences of the recovery of damages?
But that’s where we are: emotional distress damages stemming from one’s
own physical injury are excludable, and emotional distress damages
stemming from another person’s physical injury are also excludable.89 On
the other hand, damages for severe emotional distress with resulting
physical injury and sickness are taxable.90
There are other “close call” cases that become problematic under the
1996 amendment’s requirement of “personal physical injury.” For example,
in 1955 and 1956, the IRS issued rulings that damages received as
compensation for loss of freedom as a prisoner of war were tax-exempt
because they compensated for the loss of personal rights.91 The IRS rulings
did not require that the prisoner suffer physical injury or sickness, although

88. Id. at *4. Tax law practitioner Robert W. Wood suggests that bad wording in
settlement agreements is often the primary reason these “close call” cases go against the
taxpayer. Robert W. Wood, Bad Settlement Agreement Wording Spells Taxes — Again, 173
TAX NOTES FED. 965, 966 (2021). Wood notes that personal injury lawyers are often not
sufficiently attuned to the tax consequences of the words they use in their complaints and
their settlement agreements. Id. at 966–67.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 54–55, 57.
90. See supra text accompanying note 42. And what about emotional distress damages
stemming from physical injury to a treasured pet? While in most states such damages are not
awarded because the damage to the pet is mere damage to property and therefore measured
by the loss of the pet’s fair market value, there are a handful of cases that have awarded
emotional distress damages to the pet’s owner. See, e.g., Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981) (death of pet dog). For an overall summary of the
law on damages for injury to pets, see Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-Economic
Damages in Pet Litigation: The Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L. REV.
227 (2006). Presumably any such compensatory damages would be taxable as physical
injury to an animal is not a physical injury to a person.
91. Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213; Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20.
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that is often the case for such prisoners.92 The rulings also covered those
damages received on account of inhumane treatment.93 Those rulings
appear to have remained in effect until they were declared obsolete in
2007.94 Now such damages would be covered by § 104(a)(2). But the ruling
declaring the former positions obsolete did nothing to answer whether
inhumane treatment damages, which do not necessarily cause physical
injury or sickness, are taxable. And if damages are paid in a lump sum,
must they be allocated between those damages attributable to physical
injury and other injuries such as emotional distress and pain and suffering,
which are likely attributable to the imprisonment rather than the physical
injury?
A similar question arises in cases involving damages received for being
wrongfully imprisoned or being wrongfully convicted by a governmental
entity. Even if the wrongful imprisonment resulted in physical harm,
damages are typically awarded for emotional distress as well as the physical
harm.95 The emotional distress in those cases usually stems from the
wrongful imprisonment, not from the physical harm. In that case, to apply §
104(a)(2), one would have to apportion the damages between the physical
injury and the emotional distress. This problem has been resolved for
wrongful imprisonment that results from a wrongful conviction by the
passage of § 139F, added to the Internal Revenue Code in 2015.96 Under §
139F, all damages received are excluded.97
But problems remain for wrongful imprisonments that are not the result
of wrongful convictions. For example, in Stadnyk v. Commissioner, the
taxpayer was wrongfully arrested for writing a bad check.98 Her bank had
wrongfully dishonored a check that she had written when she had asked the
bank to stop payment on the check because the goods purchased with the
92. See supra note 91.
93. See supra note 91.
94. See Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747.
95. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 201045023 (Nov. 12, 2010) (concluding that a
wrongfully incarcerated person who is physically injured while incarcerated can exclude
damages received for the wrongful incarceration to the extent the damages are attributable to
the physical injury, but providing no guidance on how to make that determination); see also
Robert W. Wood, Wrongful Conviction Settlements Are Retroactively Tax Free, 150 TAX
NOTES 1595 (Mar. 28, 2016) (discussing this ruling and the problem of allocation).
96. For a discussion of the enactment of this provision and an analysis of its coverage,
see Robert W. Wood, Dollars and Sense, 80 TEX. B.J. 432 (2017).
97. Id. at 433.
98. 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 475, 2008 WL 5330828, at *1 (T.C. Dec. 22, 2008), aff’d 367 F.
App’x 586 (6th Cir. 2010).
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check were inferior.99 She was not injured when she was arrested and
jailed.100 As a result, the damages were fully taxable, although some might
view a wrongful confinement as a form of physical injury, even if there are
no observable bruises or cuts.101 If she had been physically injured, the
damage award would have been allocated between the physical injury and
the emotional distress.102 Section 139F does not help a taxpayer like
Stadnyk; she was not wrongfully convicted, but only wrongfully arrested.
Finally, some cases involve physical conditions that do not necessarily
involve physical injuries or sickness. For example, a court held that a tort
victim had a triable claim to recover compensatory damages where he had
suffered harm from a clinic misdiagnosing him as having HIV.103 The clinic
tested and treated him, but he was not physically injured.104 Nor is it clear
how § 104(a)(2) would apply to wrongful birth or wrongful pregnancy
cases. Wrongful birth cases involve some form of negligence by a physician
that causes a woman to decide to give birth when, but for the negligence,
she would have decided otherwise. Wrongful pregnancy cases typically
involve a botched sterilization that the woman (and man) believed would
prevent pregnancy.105 These cases all involve a physical condition
(pregnancy and birth), but is pregnancy a sickness or a physical injury?
While Parkinson held that a heart attack was a physical sickness,106
lesser physical reactions to fright or fear are not clearly recognizable as
99. Id.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Apparently, the taxpayer’s attorney as well as the bank had concluded that the
damages were sufficiently connected with a physical injury that they should not be taxable.
See David M. Higgins and Janet Guzman, Fixing the Definition of Physical Personal Injury,
174 TAX NOTES FED. 221 (Jan. 10, 2022). A number of commentators take this position as
well, most notably Robert W. Wood, who has written more articles than anyone else on the
question of what damages should be excluded under §104. In his view, “the loss of liberty
and physical confinement is itself a physical injury within the meaning of section 104.” See
Robert W. Wood, Tax-Free Wrongful Imprisonment Recoveries, 130 TAX NOTES 961 (Feb.
21, 2011).
102. Before the enactment of § 139F, the IRS took this position regarding damages
received for being wrongfully convicted. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory Mem. 2010-45023.
103. Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 820 (D.C. 2011).
104. See id. at 819.
105. See Katherine A. Gehring, Casenote, Ohio’s Approach to Prenatal Torts—A
Different Strand of DNA: Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Associates,
Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1160 (Ohio 2006), 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 235, 238 (2007).
106. Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-142, 2010 WL 2595005, at *5 (T.C. June
28, 2010).
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such. People often faint in reaction to something they see.107 Fainting can
result in additional physical injuries such as concussions and broken teeth.
If the defendant did not touch the plaintiff but only caused the plaintiff fear
(e.g., by holding a gun to the plaintiff’s head), is any recovery possible
from the defendant for assault attributable to a physical sickness (fainting)
or physical injuries, i.e., those that resulted from the fainting that initially
resulted from the fear? If a plaintiff is so upset by a defendant’s actions that
she vomits, is that sufficient to satisfy § 104(a)(2)? Or is the physical
manifestation merely a result of the initial emotional distress? If the latter,
then § 104(a)(2) does not apply to exclude the damages.
VI. Blum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-18
I began this Article with what I consider the paramount common law
inquiry for determining whether or not damages are taxable income: in lieu
of what were the damages awarded?108 And I will end with the recently
decided, problematic case of Blum v. Commissioner.109 Blum involves a
malpractice claim against the taxpayer’s lawyer.110 One would think the
most relevant question is, why were the damages paid? If they were to
reimburse the taxpayer for an out-of-pocket loss, then, as recognized in
Clark v. Commissioner, the damages are not income.111
In Blum, the taxpayer sued her lawyer for mishandling her personal
injury lawsuit.112 She had been personally injured by a hospital’s negligence
when she was a patient at the hospital.113 There is no question that her

107. See Marc D. Ginsberg & Tricia E. McVicker, Not for the Faint of Heart: Does a
Hospital Owe a Duty to Warn a Squeamish Visitor?, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 473 (2008),
for discussion of an array of tort cases in which the plaintiffs claimed damages for fainting,
which, in most cases, caused themselves further physical injury. In most of these cases the
plaintiff was unable to obtain compensatory damages because the hospital or emergency
facility did not have a duty to this plaintiff, but only to the patient. Id.
108. See supra Part I.
109. 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1147, 2021 WL 632330 (T.C. Feb. 18, 2021), aff’d No. 2171113, 2022 WL 1797334 (9th Cir. June 2, 2022).
110. Id., 2021 WL 632330, at *1.
111. Clark v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4. In Clark, a lawyer
gave taxpayer Clark bad advice about how to file his tax return, and Clark ended up paying
more in tax that he rightfully should have paid. Id. at 333–34. The damages were to
reimburse him for that extra cash that he paid out of his own pocket; Clark was merely
getting his own money back. Id. at 335.
112. Blum, 2021 WL 632330, at *1.
113. Id.
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lawsuit against the hospital was for personal physical injury damages.114
She did not allege any emotional distress damages.115 However, she did
incur pain and suffering as a result of her injury from the use of a broken
wheelchair provided to her by the hospital.116 After losing her case against
the hospital, she sued her lawyers, claiming that but for their negligence she
would have recovered her physical injury damages.117 The lawyers readily
agreed to pay her $125,000 to settle her claim.118 The settlement agreement
provided that the payment was to settle her malpractice claim against them
in full.119 The settlement agreement also provided that her lawyers’
negligence had not resulted in any physical injury to her.120 The only
physical injuries she suffered were due to the hospital’s negligence.121 The
Tax Court latched onto this language in the settlement agreement and ruled
that since the damages were paid for malpractice negligence, which did not
result in any physical injuries, the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) could not
apply.122
This can’t be correct. But for the lawyers’ negligence she would have
received damages from the hospital that would not have been taxable under
§ 104(a)(2). The malpractice damages were intended to make her whole.
Paying taxable damages of $125,000 is not the same as obtaining
nontaxable damages of $125,000 from the hospital. That settlement was
paid in lieu of the personal physical injury award that she otherwise would
have received. That makes the malpractice settlement damages nontaxable.
That should be the result in this case. However, the Ninth Circuit has
recently affirmed the Tax Court.123 It did so in a memorandum opinion that
is a mere five paragraphs long, deemed unsuitable for publication.124 The
opinion fails to grapple at all with the taxpayer’s argument that the
settlement with her attorneys was a direct result of her claim against the
hospital for the physical injuries she sustained while a patient there. The
court merely notes that she cannot prove any such causal link because her
settlement agreement with the law firm stated that the law firm had not
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Blum v. Comm’r, No. 21-71113, 2022 WL 1797334 (9th Cir. June 2, 2022).
See id.
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caused her any physical injuries.125 True enough. But the inquiry should not
stop there. The question still remains as to why she had a valid cause of
action against her attorneys. In my view, it is because they failed to obtain
for her the physical injury award that she was entitled to receive but for
their negligence. That makes her similar to the taxpayer in Lyeth v. Hoey.126
And, as noted in the Introduction, even if § 104(a)(2) appears inapplicable
to the damages paid, we must still consider the “in lieu of” doctrine.127
VII. Conclusion
The purpose of this Article has been to question the wisdom of the 1996
amendment to § 104(a)(2). It is difficult to identify a strong policy
justification for only excluding damages for physical injuries or sickness
from taxation. That dividing line is not only questionable as a policy matter,
but it also turns out to be difficult to apply. Thus, it is not the “bright line”
that some imagined it to be. Tort law has moved away from requiring
physical injury or impact before emotional distress damages can be
awarded. Tort law has recognized that the harm of emotional distress is just
as worthy of compensation as physical injury is. Tax law should follow in
that direction: it should either exclude all personal tort damages or none.
Drawing an unjustifiable line is bad tax policy.

125. Id. at *1.
126. 305 U.S. 188, 196 (1938) (ruling that an heir should not have to report a settlement
amount as taxable income where this settlement was paid in lieu of damages that he would
have been entitled to receive from his undue influence claim against the estate).
127. As this Article was “in press,” a request for rehearing en banc was pending before
the Ninth Circuit in the Blum case. I hope the court does reconsider. But even if arguments I
make in this Article turn out to moot in this case, I hope they will be considered in any
similar case going forward.
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